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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
AcT-THE SuPREME CouRT GIVEs THE AcT hs FmsT INTERPRETATION-The Federal Administrative Procedure Act1 received its first
thorough consideration by the Supreme Court in the recent case of
1

60 Stat. L. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1946) §1001 et seq.
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Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath. 2 The Court hel4 that deportation proceedings must conform to section 5,3 whicli provides for notice, opportunity for a hearing, ·separation of prosecution and quasi-judicial &mctions, and the issuance of declaratory orders by the agency, and to
section 11,4 which prescribes an independent status for presiding
officers. The scope of section 5 is limited to administrative adjudica, tions _"required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." There is no specific requirement "in
the Immigration Act, the applicable legislation in this field, for a
hearing before an alien can be deported. A hearing, however, has long
been deemed necessary to ~atisfy the requirements of due process,5 and
such hearings have been held before immigration inspectors who do
not satisfy the requirements of section 11. Thus, in reaching its
decisicm, the Court (in a 7 to I decision) interpreted the words "required by statute," _as found in section 5, to include hearings required
by statute either in express terms or by judicial ·interpretation. This
compels an important change in immigration hearing procedures.
This decision, which resolved a long-standing argument as to the
meaning of the phrase, 6 is of importance to the agency practitioner
because it sheds light on the Supreme Court's general attitude towards
the FAPA. Perhaps the most concise statement of this attitude is found
in the portion of the opinion that .Justice Jackson, writing for the
majorjty, devoted to tracing the history of the act, wherein he said:
"The Act thus represents a long period of study and strife; it settles longcontinued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon
which opposing social and political forces have come to rest. It contains many compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some ambiguities. Experience may reveal defects. But it would be a disservice to our
form of government and to the administrative process itself if the courts
should fail, so far as the terms of the Act warrant, to give effect to its
remedial purposes ~here the evils it was aimed at appear." 7 An investigation o~ the method by which Justice Jackson applieq. this general
2

339 U.S. 33, 70 S.Ct. 445 (1950).

s 60 Stat. L. 239, §5 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1946) §1004.

60 Stat. L. 244, §11 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1946) §1010.
5The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 23 S.Ct. 611 (1903); Kwack Jan Fat v.
White, 253 U.S. 454, 40 S.Ct. 566 (1920).
6 The contentions of both contestants have been upheld in recent decisions. See Fajardo
v. United States, Civil No. 46-214, S.D. N.Y., June 24, 1948; Eisler v. Clark (D.C. D.C.
1948) 77 F. Supp. 610.
7Wong Yang !,ung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 at 40-41, 70 S.Ct. 445 (1950).
4

1950]

CoM.MENTs

1129

policy to the facts of the case reveals the impa<;:t the Administrative
Procedure Act will have upon administrative law in the coming months.
The government's argument that section 5 is intended to ·apply only
when explicit statutory words granting a right to an adjudication can
be found was based largely upon the fact that in the original bill section 5 was to apply to hearings required ''by law."8 Upon the suggestion of the Attorney General9 the wording was changed to its present
form. The necessary inference to be drawn from this change, the government contended, was that Congress must have intended a narrow
application of the section. It would be difficult to find better evidence
of Congressional intent than this pre-enactment history of the act. This
argument, however, was dismissed with the one-sentence comment that
"the legislative history [of the act] is more conflicting than the text is
ambiguous." In lieu of the government's analysis the Court based its
decision upon the proposition that because there would be no constitutional authority for deportation without a hearing and because the
applicable provisions of the Constitution, here due process, permeate
every enactment of Congress, the reasonable and therefore proper construction of ''by statute" is one that includes provisions read into statutes by the judiciary as well as those specifically provided for by the
legislature.
The significance of this decision insofar as it sheds light on the
Supreme Court's view of the act is apparent. In determining the meaning of a particular phrase in the act, the Court will not be persuaded
by the minute details of the act's pre-enactment history. Instead, the
Court will emphasize the overall purpose Congress had for enacting
the bill. That purpose, the Court decided, was to prevent arbitrary and
biased manipulation by the federal administrative agencies of their everincreasing power. As applied to the facts of this case this policy curtails
the practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge.
Also, the decision indicates that the Supreme Court will not allow
the effectiveness of the act to be reduced by the fact that many of its
provisions are vague and ambiguous. Instead, it will make every effort
to give it a meaning, consistent with the above-stated purpose of Con8 Sec. 301 of the bills proposed in the majority and minority recommendations of the
FINAL REPORT oP THE AnoRNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITrEB ON ADMINisTBATIVE PRoCBDUl\B

195, 232-235 (1941).
9 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675
and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st sess. 1456 (1941).
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gress for enacting it, even where it is necessary to resort to judicial
legislation. Those who feared the act yVould be of little practical value
in curbing the acquisitive tendencies of the federal agencies may take
heart from this decision.
Fred W. Freeman, S.Ed.

